View: Navigating India’s geopolitical engagement in Central Asia

India’s engagement with the Central Asian countries should be looked at from both geo-cultural and geo-strategic perspectives. Along with this, the growth in bilateral mutual trade and economic cooperation will certainly add substance to the existing relations.
India’s geopolitical engagement with Central Asia is shaped by four major structural perspectives. These are: a) the fallout of the Afghan security situation on Central Asia; b) a relatively weakened Russia, especially in pursuing its policy towards Central Asia whom Moscow once considered its "soft underbelly"; c) the rise of China in Central Asia which to a great extent is posing a threat to regional security and the stability of this region; d) lesser interest shown by the Western countries especially after the withdrawal of NATO troops from war-ravaged Afghanistan and Taliban's takeover of power.

In the above perspectives, one can outline five major geopolitical interests for India. These are: a) strengthening geopolitical engagement with Central Asia in a geo-cultural framework; b) cooperating with the Central Asian countries to checkmate radicalism, extremism and narco-trafficking emanating from Afghanistan; c) strategizing India’s connectivity with Central Asia; d) checkmating China’s hegemonisation process in the region; and e) enunciating a cooperative geopolitical approach in the Central Asian geopolitical space.

Some of the above-mentioned trajectories need to be examined in greater detail to understand the nature of India’s engagement in the Central Asian space. Various studies suggest that India has made its presence felt in the region "relatively late". Scholars find similarities in this approach with the early 1990s when India pursued its policy towards this region through Moscow. However, despite being a late starter, India, over the years, has begun playing a crucial role in the geopolitical structure of Central Asia.

One aspect which needs greater attention is the changing geopolitical equation in Central Asia. Though the recent Kazakh crisis provided an opportunity to Russia to play a role through CSTO, if one looks at the current geopolitical scenario, one can notice a declining role of Russia in relative terms. In this context, one can add here that Russia’s position on Taliban also alienated the Central Asian countries from Moscow to a certain extent. Similarly, the invisible zero-sum game that one is witnessing between China and Russia is also to a certain extent weakening the latter’s position in the region. The Western countries are also taking lesser interest in the development of Central Asia, especially after their withdrawal from Afghanistan. There, however, are murmurs that the US is keen to regain its lost foothold both in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

In this continuous geopolitical flux, what one notices is growing Chinese clout. The Chinese policy makers, in line with their diplomatic style of mixing trade with a hidden agenda to control resources, have made major inroads through the OBOR strategy in this part of the world which British Geographer Halfrod Mackinder called "Heartland". "Debt diplomacy", taking over of oil & gas industries and controlling key pipeline routes are some of the key features of China’s diplomatic overture in Central Asia. Even the 2020 Kyrgyz political crisis was attributed to China’s involvement. It is also true that there is growing discontent regarding China’s role at the local level in Central Asia. This is not a new phenomenon but can be traced back to the Aksai riot in Kyrgyzstan when people from the Southern part protested against a land deal which the-then Askar Akaev government had signed with China. Similarly, one witnesses sporadic violence against Chinese investment all over Central Asia. There is a view that because of Chinese investment and aid, Beijing is assuming a dominating role in Central Asia. This is partly true. Over the years, China is also relegating itself to a marginal role in this region, especially at the popular level.

To gain a geopolitical foothold in the region, there are three issues which New Delhi should strive to address. The first is by strengthening relations with Central Asia through a geo-cultural framework. In this context, one can see that there is a lot of goodwill among the common people of Central Asia towards India. It is in this background that India can gradually assume a predominant role in the geopolitical space in a region where China currently has an upper hand. In this regard, even Russia needs India as a counter-balance to China in Central Asia. This issue was discussed extensively at the recent 2 plus 2 meeting between India and Russia that happened during Putin’s December 2021 visit.

The second aspect is boosting connectivity with the Central Asian countries. The Chabahar port, located in Iran, can serve as a nodal point for India's connectivity with the Central Asian space. The recent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan raises some fresh questions because Afghanistan happens to be a key transit point, but the Chabahar Port can still play a role in cementing India’s relations with Central Asia. Various studies have suggested linking Chabahar with the INSTC project. Similarly, a study of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and The Pacific (titled Land Transport Linkages from Central Asia to Sea Ports in The South and The East, published in 1995) suggests that distance from Bandar Abbas port to Ashgabat is "1,695 km, Tashkent is 2,004 km, Almaty is 3,993km and Bishkek is 3,713 km". Similarly, the distance between Chabahar and Bandar Abbas is around 670 km. In this context, connecting both the port cities as part of Chabahar initiative through road and then linking it with the existing route to Central Asia will be a viable option. Similarly, though Iran is under a spell of US sanctions, the Biden Administration is continuing the policy of allowing India to conduct trade through the Chabahar Port. It is in this context that one can envisage a viable trade connectivity with Central Asia through this port which India has been developing over the years.

Another issue that needs greater attention is that India and Central Asian countries have also been collaborating in recent years to prevent the growth and proliferation of religious extremism. This issue has assumed importance in recent years, particularly after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In this regard, the holding of the NSA-level talk between India and Central Asian countries in November 2021 was a significant development. The NSA-level meeting was followed by the 3rd Meeting of India-Central Asia Dialogue, which took place in December 2021 and outlined major areas of cooperation between India-Central Asian countries. Both these meetings highlighted cooperation on counter-terrorism, sustainable socio-economic development and augmenting connectivity.

Choosing the presidents of Central Asian countries as chief guests at the Republic Day celebrations is a welcome move. This demonstrates that India and Central Asian countries are both civilizational and strategic partners.


The author teaches at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views are personal.