US or EU? Does Greece need to choose?

The Euro-Atlantic security architecture, as we’ve known it since 1945, is collapsing. The aftershocks of Washington’s seismic shift in stance are also rocking Greece, which is trying to come to grips with developments and plan how – and with whom – to align.

How can a medium-sized country, in a highly unstable region, sharing borders with an unpredictable neighbor whose influence is constantly growing, respond to the changing balance of power? As the gap between Europe and America widens, should Greece choose sides? Kathimerini English Edition reached out to Greek and foreign political analysts for answers.

Personal relationships

“Under such immense uncertainty, Greece needs to be close to both; the hedging between Washington and Brussels becomes even more important,” says Ian Lesser, vice president and Brussels chief of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “The Trump administration puts a lot of emphasis on individual relationships and much less on institutional ones. So, if Greece is to hedge the risk, the two things that might be useful are: building that leadership-to-leadership relationship with the US – if there is an opening for that – and, secondly, having an eye on the Greek role in whatever new arrangements the European Union develops, as a hedge against American disengagement from Europe.”

For Professor Panayotis Tsakonas, head of foreign policy and security at the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), whether Athens should look to Brussels or Washington is a “false dilemma.” “Given current dynamics, there is a plausible answer that says ‘with both.’ Greece should maintain the relationship with the US by also emphasizing points of strategic interest, notably the 3+1 alliance [Cyprus, Greece, Israel plus the US] in the Eastern Mediterranean,” he says.

On the other hand, he adds, “there is Europe, and the reasonable attitude is that we have every reason to support EU decisions taken collectively regarding European defense.”

Donatienne Ruy, director of the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, says that the Greek government “has been forward-leaning on transatlantic ties, which has allowed the opening of a second strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean – one that isn’t in Turkey, an ally that was becoming somewhat of a headache of late.” Furthermore, “economic reforms have also shown a willingness to make Greece more competitive and in line with the mood in Brussels to look at competitiveness and growing European business.” “Greece needs to not question or reverse any of these policy moves amid the developing transatlantic rift: It has more weight within a unified European Union that supports European economic interests and defense investments (including to support Ukraine) while still being able to leverage the deep connections it has with the United States, from people-to-people ties (e.g., diaspora) to trade,” she adds.

‘No fight’

“Greece will go with Europe, but that does not mean that it will pick a fight with the US,” says Maria Gavouneli, an international law professor at Athens University and director general of ELIAMEP. “We need someone to support us and it is clear that this will not come from the US, so the priority is Europe,” she says, adding that Athens should participate in all EU projects in Ukraine. “We should be at the heart of Europe, so that no decision can be taken without us.”

‘Even if the US commitment to security in Europe is on the decline, it is not necessarily true that the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean will disappear’

Greece did not attend the recent mini-summits of European leaders held in Paris and London. One reason may have been a dispute with France and Britain over any defense agreements with Turkey. Nevertheless, the Greek prime minister contacted the Ukrainian president, conveying Athens’ commitment to continue providing assistance to Kyiv at the highest possible level. Analysts agree that Athens should join the “coalition of the willing” formed by countries that declare that they will support Ukraine, firstly, to defend itself while the war lasts and, secondly, if peace is achieved, to provide military assistance by forming a peacekeeping force.

If he had to give Greece, and other European countries, one piece of advice, it would be “invest in Europe,” says Josef Janning, senior associate fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). “What other choice do you have? Europeans have to understand that, in the current situation, we cannot rely on the continuation or continued existence of a rules-based international order, whether it is trade or security or the rule of law.”

Under the radar

“For the time being, Greece is not in Washington’s sights,” says Ruy. “Athens can try keep it that way, but should that change, maintaining European alignment while identifying long-standing ties with the US may be the best course of action.” Right now, the main channel of communication for Athens is US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who is, at least, familiar with Eastern Mediterranean matters. Rubio was one of the lawmakers who introduced two related bills Trump signed into law during his first term: the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, or EastMed Act, in 2019 and the US-Greece Defense and Interparliamentary Partnership Act in 2021.

According to Lesser, Athens still matters to the US and “even if the US commitment to security in Europe is on the decline, it is not necessarily true that the US presence in the Eastern Mediterranean will disappear.”

“In the event of a crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, one could still expect Washington to be concerned and to be engaged. The US has many interests in that, but we are in a very new world and it is very hard to judge how the Trump administration will react. Much will depend on the trajectory of relations between Washington and Ankara, and it is completely unclear how this will develop.”

Trump’s way

“The way that the US President Trump acts in international affairs is based on power and domination strategies, primarily,” says Janning. “Greece can rely on the fact that Trump will find positive words about Greece, because its defense spending is significantly higher than that of many other European countries. Donald Trump doesn’t care why this is the case. It is the case because Greece and Turkey have problems with each other. So, Greece has always concluded that it needs a strong and capable military. But for Trump, the point is, can I use Greece to bully, let’s say, the Netherlands or Belgium or Portugal. He may say, ‘look at Greece, the Greeks they are doing fine. Great people. I love the Greeks,’ but it is pure instrumentalization.”

However, Janning adds, “that’s the way he sees European countries. For him it’s a pawn at the table, but you don’t move autonomously, you are moved by the big powers.”

Tsakonas says that if the Ukrainian front the strategic relationship between Greece and the US may wane but it will not disappear. The 3+1 format is still of interest to the US because of Israel. Trump also recently expressed the US commitment to the IMEEC (the India, Middle East, Europe economic corridor), which he sees as a counterbalance to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, Greece has upgraded relations with India and expects to become IMEEC’s gateway to Europe.

The fifth column

As Gavouneli says, Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia function as a fifth column inside the EU, as was evident during last week’s EU summit. “So we need the UK and we are moving the debate to the level of NATO. If Britain was still in the EU, we wouldn’t need to do this. That’s where Turkey comes in, saying it has the readiest army,” she adds. Greece will find it difficult to refuse participation in an EU peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, says Tsakonas, adding that Ankara’s overture to London is not to be underplayed, since it is the only one willing to offer boots on the ground. “Greece participates in any case, and what form this participation will take remains to be seen. At the same time, we must make sure to quickly understand and forecast Turkey’s interventions in Europe’s needs.”

For Lesser, a Turkey that is closer to Europe is not a bad thing and Greece can even play an important role in Ankara-Brussels relations. “Anything that in a sense anchors Turkey to the West is positive in terms of security and predictability in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Athens,” he says.