Jake Sullivan: ‘We worked behind the scenes’

Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser to former US president Joe Biden, details in an interview with Kathimerini how Washington systematically worked behind the scenes to de-escalate tensions between Greece and Turkey. “Whenever tensions did flare up in the Eastern Med, we made clear to Ankara that we wanted to lower the temperature and resume a less confrontational posture,” he says.

Sullivan describes the US-Greece bilateral defense relationship as one of the strongest in the world and expresses his satisfaction with Cyprus’ incredible transformation over the last decade. As one of the most influential architects of US foreign policy over the last four years, he voices deep concern over the growing rift in transatlantic relations and warns against attempts to broker peace in Ukraine through what he calls the country’s “surrender” to Putin.

We witnessed one of the strongest transatlantic alliances during Biden’s administration, mainly due to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Now, everything seems to be falling apart. How concerned are you about the unprecedented tensions in this relationship today?

When we left office on January 20, America’s alliances had never been stronger, and NATO was bigger and more unified than ever. The strength of the allied response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine demonstrated why NATO, a 75-year-old alliance, is still critical today. Now it has been less than eight weeks since I walked out of the White House, and so I want to be careful about coming in with the sharpest critiques. But the concerns I have about the current administration’s approach to the transatlantic relationship are significant. It is deeply concerning to see people engaging in wildly destructive behavior that is at odds with my view of the core national interest and our core national character. The arrow seems to be pointing in the wrong direction on fundamental things like the question of how we treat our friends and allies, and whether America needs to adopt a zero-sum mindset that punishes our closest friends in order to put us ahead. I believe in the basic notion that the United States can have a purposeful, positive-sum attitude that delivers for the American people, but also supports the broader common interest as well. The way to make America more secure is to commit to our alliances and to work together to counter shared threats and to build a better world.

How do you view the developments in Ukraine and President Donald Trump’s intention to swiftly end the war, regardless of the potential implications for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity?

First, to take a step back – Trump and [J.D.] Vance have tried to frame US policy on Ukraine as a choice between peace and war. But that’s not what’s going on here. It is a choice between true peace through supporting Ukraine in effective negotiations and false peace through surrender to Putin. I am worried about peace through surrender to Putin and what the implications are for Ukraine, for America, and for the rest of the world. Putin may pause his aggression for a time, but his appetite will be whetted for more. China’s leaders will see this as a green light for Taiwan. And our friends and allies will lose faith in us, leaving us alone on the world stage. It will bring a great moral and strategic cost to our nations. There is a better way to achieve peace – by maintaining support for Ukraine while pursuing tough, principled negotiations with Ukraine at the table. That path – despite everything – is still open. We’ve built a lot of leverage to secure a good deal. Trump just has to use it, working with Ukraine and our allies.

You mentioned before that NATO’s role remains critical, as demonstrated by its response to the war in Ukraine. Given the dramatic shift in US priorities, what are the prospects for its unity moving forward?

For now, it is unclear what exactly President Trump will do with respect to NATO – how he will proceed and how sharp a break we will see over the next four years. It could be very sharp or it could be something much more modest. We’ll just have to wait and see. But I do think there are major elements of the transatlantic relationship where there will be genuine continuity. There are core pieces of American foreign policy that will not have as sharp of a divergence as one might think, such as issues related to de-risking from China, or building diversified and resilient supply chains globally, or trying to manage the issue of stability and security in the Middle East. If the United States continues on with the basic pillars that have led to the health and vitality of our alliance system over the past few years – stitching together not only a stronger US alliance with each country, but also stitching together stronger alliances between Europe and Asia, building out our industrial and innovation bases, the effort to compete effectively with China – then even though there will be times where the changes of American politics are uncomfortable for other members of the alliance, the strength of the alliance will continue to flow.

I would like to turn to Greece’s neighborhood. Is it a fact that during your time in office, you elevated Greece as a critical actor on NATO’s southeastern flank. You deepened military and security ties by expanding bases and signing new defense agreements. Do you think Washington has fully capitalized on this relationship, or are there steps you would have taken differently if not for regional balance considerations?

The Biden administration took many steps to deepen our relationship with Greece, which remains one of the strongest bilateral defense relationships in the world. We have greatly expanded our cooperation on European energy security. We are providing Greece with F-35 aircraft, which will give it a qualitative military edge in the air domain. We have worked to expand the use of the strategic base at Souda Bay, as well as the strategic port of Alexandroupoli, and we strongly supported efforts by the Mitsotakis government to stabilize and improve relations with Ankara. We didn’t hold anything back in our relations with Greece; on the contrary, we took this relationship to an even higher level.

I will insist on my question because there is this perception that US support for Greece sometimes fell short. For example, while the US strongly defended Ukraine’s sovereignty and the international law of the sea in the South China Sea, it did not openly condemn Turkey’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine or the ongoing occupation of Cyprus. Why was there such an inconsistency?

We worked behind the scenes to support a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, taking many of our cues from the Greek government. These efforts helped stabilize the relationship to a certain degree and produced some openings for serious discussions with Ankara, which have in turn helped to reduce tensions. For example, today there is an active discussion in Turkey about the prospect of reopening the Halki seminary, a key issue strongly supported by the Biden administration as a matter of principle and religious freedom, but something that was not on the table four or five years ago. And whenever tensions did flare up in the Eastern Med, we made clear to Ankara that we wanted to lower the temperature and resume a less confrontational posture.

You mentioned the F-35s to Greece, and I would like to ask you why you approved the sale of F-16s to Turkey without imposing stricter conditions. Was it purely a matter of Alliance management, or were there other strategic considerations at play?

As part of our long-standing security relationship with Turkey, we have consistently sold them weapons platforms to enhance the collective defense of the NATO alliance. We have also had our concerns and disagreements with Turkey, and have taken steps to address those concerns. We can do both at once, express our concerns and ensure continued interoperability.

You accompanied then-vice president Biden on his trip to Cyprus in 2014 as his NSA and, a decade later, you were in the Oval Office as President Biden met with President Nikos Christodoulides. Over the past 10 years, Cyprus has deepened its strategic importance in the Eastern Mediterranean and has solidified its Western orientation and commitment. How do you see its future within the broader regional and transatlantic framework?

Cyprus has undergone an incredible transformation over the last decade or so. Our administration took many important steps to strengthen our bilateral relationship and engaged Cyprus as a key partner, for example by working together to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza. In turn, Cyprus took some serious steps to address money laundering and rule of law concerns, clearing the way for greater Western investment. In the defense sphere, the passage of the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Act in 2019 gave us a legal framework to finally begin providing defense articles to Cyprus, and this will hopefully continue in the next administration, since Cyprus has a legitimate need for defensive capabilities and the US is well positioned to provide them. Cyprus is also now on track to join the Visa Waiver Program. The bottom line is this: Today Cyprus and the United States are closer than at any point in history, and that’s something we’re very proud of.