President Donald Trump’s intentions to strike a peace deal in Ukraine without security guarantees for Kyiv and his possible relinquishing of America’s role as supreme allied commander of NATO have sparked concern among allies. U.S. partners are wondering if Washington is abandoning its 80+ year military commitments in Asia and Europe, and many are asking what measures they need to take to secure themselves during Trump 2.0.

In short, friends of America are worried that Washington’s approach to overseas military commitments is over and that forthcoming economic and geopolitical realignments will make them less secure. Few should be surprised of where things appear to be heading. Trump has long expressed doubt about the utility of Nato and America’s defence of others. Trump’s unorthodox views towards America’s military alliances goes back to at least 1987 at which time the then 41-year old real estate developer bought newspaper ads criticizing Japan and Europe for not paying their proper share for common defence.

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During the 2024 presidential campaign, candidate Trump stated he would not defend Nato-member countries who do not meet defence spending targets. Additionally, on different occasions Trump has cast doubts about his willingness to defend Taiwan, suggesting that efforts to ward off a Chinese invasion are impractical given the island state’s proximity to mainland China. President Trump’s recent opposition to including U.S. security guarantees in the Ukraine minerals deal is only the latest example reflecting his unconventional approach to foreign policy.

Put simply, Washington’s abandonment of its prior role as underwriter of the global order weakens deterrence and increases prospects of great power conflicts, nuclear exchange and world wars. Whether or not Trump 2.0’s approach will be adopted by future administrations remains unclear. Trump’s public statements against Ukraine and Nato appear to have had their effect on American public opinion. A February 3-9, 2025 Pew Research Center poll found that nearly a third of U.S. adults (30 per cent) think Washington is providing too much support for Ukraine’s war efforts against Russia (up from 27 per cent in 2024) and a declining number of Americans believe that the U.S. benefits from Nato membership.

Amid these dynamics, America’s allies will need to come to terms with this outcome and act. This change to the global security framework must compel American partners in Asia and Europe to address this question: In addition to forming new geopolitical relationships, what economic and hard power military measures can be taken to protect themselves from Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping? For starters, vulnerable European states – the Baltics, Georgia, Moldova and the western Balkans – should consider engaging in economic treatises with Washington.

Similar to the proposed U.S.-Ukraine minerals deal, the idea is for such partnerships to create a sustained American financial commitment to the development of the threatened countries’ economies and to generate the economic growth needed to purchase U.S.-made weapons. Additionally, the presence of American businesses on local soil could help deter attacks by outside powers who do not want to cross swords with Washington. Yet, economic treatises for Ukraine and Europe are not enough. In a Trump 2.0 world, Europe will need to assume more responsibility for its own security as Washington exits the stage.

This means EU and Nato member counties negotiating a new security construct for the continent, spending more on defence and expanding their militaries. The March 5 announcement by Germany’s Chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz of a political deal to dedicate hundreds of billions of euros for infrastructure and defence is one such necessary development. Another step in the right direction was UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s March 2 disclosure of a four-point plan for a multinational “coalition of the willing” to defend Ukraine and bring the war to a conclusion. While a decline in American military support may be unavoidable while Trump is in office, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia must do everything they can to protect their existing intelligence cooperation programmes with Washington.

Terminations of intelligence sharing will leave these states blindfolded and vulnerable. However, it is likely that economic partnerships, increased defence spending and new coalitions will need to be bolstered with additional measures. A rethink of nuclear deterrence in Europe will be required. Specifically, the United Kingdom and France will need to boost their nuclear weapons capabilities and place fellow Europe partners under a new protective nuclear umbrella. While both countries’ at-sea nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines are vital, they are insufficient.

Paris will need to re-establish its land-based medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles and London must reinvest in air-delivered nuclear weapons using either F-35s or Typhoon fighter aircraft. In the Indo-Pacific, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand will also need to rearm. This will require build-outs of naval, coast guard and missile defense capabilities. Additionally, investments will be needed in drone technology, sea mines, long range anti-ship missiles and cruise missiles. Increases in defence spending, replete with American weapons systems purchases, could ingratiate Asian states into the good graces of Trump.

Deliberate efforts need to be made for local countries to emulate Beijing and build their own antiaccess/arial denial (A2/AD) strategies to defend territory, protect against aerial and maritime incursions, and deter Chinese aggression. Regional states should continue on-going efforts to deepen information sharing and defence ties such as recent partnerships among the Philippines, Japan, India, Vietnam, Australia and Indonesia. This same approach should be pursued with Pacific Island states, Canada and willing European partners.

“The Quad” diplomatic partnership between Australia, Japan, India and the United States will need to deepen economic and security engagement to keep the Pacific open and stable. Likewise, the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security and technology partnership (AUKUS) must receive the investments it requires for stepped up nuclear-powered submarine production and regional nuclear deterrence.

South Korea and Japan will be forgiven if they take the disturbing yet understandable step of going nuclear. During a time when the U.S. adopts a narrow pursuit of its own national interests and cedes its role as the security provider for the rulesbased order, the world will need to adjust to the resulting uncertainty and instability. To address these new realities, U.S. partners will need to engage in long-term efforts to rebuild their own security capabilities, construct new alliances and reinvest in the resilience of their nations.

(The writer is Associate Clinical Faculty at Claremont Graduate University in Los Angeles.)