Thinking Laterally in the Indian Ocean

Australia’s commitment to strengthening the Indian Ocean’s multilateral architecture is a long-term goal that will require patience. Australia should leverage bi- and mini-lateral cooperation in the interim to shape a region that reflects its interests.

Comprising three continents and more than one third of the world’s population, the Indian Ocean region is a vast and complex space home to many diverse states. It is also of growing geopolitical significance to Australia. According to Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Tim Watts, “Australia’s approach is to be an engaged partner, not a passive bystander. We want to work with partners to shape the kind of region we want.”

Whereas the international relations of other important regions such as Southeast Asia and the Pacific are scaffolded with relatively well-functioning institution architecture, a dearth of effective multilateral institutions means that there are currently limited habits of significant cooperation between countries of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Rim Association, for example, can often struggle to achieve outcomes due to its scope and size, its consensus-drive model, and the diverse range of interests and perspectives that each country seeks to advance. Other organisations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation are stymied without an improvement in India-Pakistan relations.

For Australia, this means that “shaping the kind of region we want” will require patience, long-term vision, and building trust and cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis at the bilateral and minilateral levels. A new paper from the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue outlines some ways in which this can be done.

Bilaterally, Australia’s ability to forge intimate relationships within the region are critical to its ability to be a productive and trusted partner. One such example is the active program of defence coordination with Sri Lanka on issues related to Australia’s border security. A convergence of Australia’s own interests in combatting the flow of maritime asylum seekers with Sri Lanka’s desire to gain greater maritime awareness and capabilities has led to enhanced bilateral cooperation with Sri Lanka’s navy and coast guard, including the gifting of two patrol boats and a surveillance aircraft.

Development assistance likewise offers fertile ground for strengthening bilateral relationships with countries in the region. The Australian government should engage with local experts to help understand local priorities and better inform Australian engagement through more targeted development assistance and capacity building. A multidisciplinary study commissioned by Australia’s High Commission in Bangladesh that engages local Bangladeshi experts on their country’s economic security offers lessons in this regard, and should be extended to other countries across the region.

Minilateral cooperation – informal collaborations between small groups of states – is another way in which Australia can help contribute to regional stability and prosperity. Maritime domain awareness is an area where Australia has significant experience and where major Indian Ocean states are still building their own capabilities (which Australia sees as being in its own interests to help advance). In this regard Australia can leverage existing minilateral activities under the aegis of the Quad grouping’s Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness project to prioritise building interoperability in maritime domain awareness and surveillance within at least the north-east Indian Ocean and extending further as capabilities increase. As part of this project, Australia should also advance the provision of radio frequency satellite data to the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and the Regional Operations Coordination Centre in the Seychelles.

Collaboration throughout South Asia can often be impeded by the region’s political history, and Indian Ocean countries can be wary of what they perceive as overbearing or hegemonic Indian behaviour. In this respect another beneficial application of minilateralism is that collaborative projects can be made more appealing when they have an outside guarantor, with an example being the India-Japan-Bangladesh connectivity program that links Northeast India to the Bay of Bengal via Bangladesh. Australia can emulate these types of programs and present itself as a trusted partner and broker for engagement within South Asia.

None of the above is to say that Australia shouldn’t simultaneously commit to building and strengthening multilateralism in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper says Australia “seek[s] to strengthen regional architecture in the Indian Ocean… and encourage more coordinated responses to developments affecting security in the Indian Ocean region” – a sentiment regularly reiterated since in ministerial speeches.

Over the long term, regional perceptions of Australia being a cultural and political outsider may work in its favour. Because it comes with significantly less baggage of history, Australia can be seen as more benign and working towards addressing the genuine problems of the region. Being seen as an honest broker provides an opportunity for Australia to be a diplomatic organiser and lead on multilateral initiatives that can help build regional habits of cooperation and address collective problems.

One area where Australian investment could reap multilateral benefits is fishing diplomacy. Australia should apply lessons from its cooperation with Pacific neighbours on combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in its engagement with Indian Ocean countries. This could include leading negotiation of a regional agreement to deny out-of-area illegal fishing vessels entry to all Indian Ocean ports – and by extension access to refuelling, transshipments, repairs, and crew changes – thereby making such operations economically unviable. As well as contributing to defending the livelihoods of legal fishing vessels from Indian Ocean states and protecting fish stocks from over-fishing, leading such an initiative would provide Australia with a diplomatic dividend throughout the region.

So, too, would helping to reform current intergovernmental fishing structures provide Australia with good will. Many of the countries responsible for illegal fishing in the region are powerful within the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. There are concerns about the effectiveness of the commission regarding the understanding of fish stocks, allocations systems, governance, and management. Indian Ocean states that have been trying to reform the commission would appreciate Australia’s assistance.

This type of targeted multilateral engagement would align with Australia’s key policies, such as the recent International Development Policy which states that “Australia is connected to many South Asian countries by the Indian Ocean, and we will continue to support the productive and sustainable use of its resources.”

Ultimately, Australia’s bi-, mini-, and multi-lateral engagement in the Indian Ocean are all means to achieving the same ends – namely, a stable and prosperous region. Leveraging bilateral, minilateral, and more targeted, issue-specific multilateral approaches can help lay some of the necessary groundwork for more broad-based multilateral cooperation in the region over the longer term. As Assistant Minister Watts says: “Influencing the trends reshaping the Indian Ocean region in the national interest will require persistent effort.”

This article draws on a new AP4D report: What does it look like for Australia to strengthen its Indian Ocean Engagement.

Tom Barber is program manager at the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D).

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.