Foreign policy for Swedish interests

SWEDEN, December 13 - First and foremost, I’d like to thank you for the opportunity to speak here at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, which plays such an important role in promoting interest in, and deepening knowledge about, foreign and security policy issues in Sweden. 

It’s important to draw on analyses such as those from the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies and the Swedish National China Centre to gain a better understanding of the rapid changes currently taking place in the world around us. We have recently seen how rapidly the situation on the ground can change when we have witnessed events in Syria, where the Assad regime has fallen after almost 14 years of civil war and unimaginable brutality against the Syrian people. These events show why we need both sharp and quick analyses of how such changes shape the conditions for Swedish foreign policy. 

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Swedish foreign policy has many facets. 

Swedish foreign policy is the 600 Swedish soldiers who will become part of NATO’s Forward Land Forces in Latvia at the start of the new year.

Swedish foreign policy is the development assistance we provide to help women and girls who are victims of sexual violence in Sudan’s civil war. 

Swedish foreign policy is the support we’re providing to Ukraine to help them win the war – political, economic, military and humanitarian. 

The Government is implementing these measures and living up to our international commitments for a reason. We’re doing so because it’s in Sweden’s interest. 

We joined NATO because we are stronger and more secure as part of the defence community of Western democracies than we would be standing alone.

We have long been and continue to be a major donor of development assistance, with the aim of helping people living in poverty, under oppression and those who are displaced, and because a more peaceful and democratic world is also good for Sweden.

We have supported and will continue to support Ukraine because it is right and just. It is a reminder that if we want to live in freedom and democracy, we must be prepared to defend these values. Ukraine’s cause is truly our cause.

In Sweden, we have not always spoken openly about what our national interests are and what they say about our foreign and security policy identity and affiliation. 

One obvious example of this is our extensive defence cooperation with NATO countries long before we actually joined the Alliance, but this often took place discretely in the past.

Some matters related to national security will always be subject to secrecy. At the same time, it is harmful if the gap between words and actions becomes too wide. If the strategic interests and values on which the Government builds its foreign policy are not expressed in public, the most important aspect of all policy – popular support – is undermined.

The Government will pursue foreign policy that promotes Sweden’s interests and values, and the Swedish people will have a clear picture of what these are. 

This also involves prioritisation. We will use Sweden’s foreign policy capital where we can make the greatest difference and where our interests are strongest. We share the responsibility to do good in the world, but bear the full responsibility to safeguard Swedish security and Swedish interests. 

The substantially deteriorated geopolitical situation makes this absolutely necessary. At the same time, international institutions and norms that we’ve long depended on are under pressure. In this new reality, we – alone or together with others – must be able to defend our interests and values ourselves in order for them to be respected.

I therefore intend to devote this speech to attempting to formulate an answer to the question: what does foreign policy currently mean for Swedish interests?

Without being exhaustive, I will start with four strategic Swedish interests that shape our foreign policy in the 2020s, and which are also expressed in the new national security strategy:

· that our neighbourhood is secure and stable, and Sweden has close, deep and constructive cooperation with its Allies and partners – particularly around the Baltic Sea and in the EU and NATO;

· that NATO’s deterrence and defence are credible; 

· that international law is respected and defended, and provides the necessary predictability and legal certainty, and that we are able to safeguard core Swedish interests such as democracy, human rights and freedoms, and gender equality, in our international engagement; and

· that we are able, despite the growing political tensions between major powers, to continue building our prosperity on both trade and research and innovation cooperation, while safeguarding our economic security.

Our interests and our values are interlinked. For example, strong cohesion within the democratic world is in Sweden’s interests. 

A world in which values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights and freedoms are upheld benefits not only the world at large, but also Sweden’s security, prosperity and democratic form of governance. 

At the same time, the implementation of foreign policy must be pragmatic, realistic and adapted to the circumstances. 

Our ability to address global challenges such as climate change, regulation of artificial intelligence and arms control requires Sweden and like-minded countries to also cooperate with those that do not necessarily share our values. This also affects the possibility to fully realise the Government’s ambitions on issues such as climate. 

In a difficult geopolitical context, every country faces conflicting foreign policy objectives. Foreign and security policy are about will, but equally about choice.

That’s why our neighbours in Finland speak of foreign and security policy grounded in value-based realism. This can also be called value-driven foreign policy for the world as it is.

What interests is our foreign policy based on?

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Standing up for international law is at the heart of Sweden’s foreign policy.

International law, democracy, human rights, gender equality and a humanitarian perspective form the basis of our foreign policy. For Sweden’s security and for stability in the world, maintaining the rules-based world order and international law is paramount.

The UN Charter – which is based on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and equality of all states – is a crucial part of this. These concepts have meaning – not just in theory, but also in practice. Just ask our Ukrainian friends. 

Since the UN Charter was adopted nearly 80 years ago, no internationally recognised state has been lost to war. Today, the principle that borders should not be moved by military force is a fundamental pillar of what we call the rules-based world order. This gives smaller states like Sweden the right to an equal voice in the international arena. Historically, this is unique. 

Russia is trying to violently overturn the rules-based world order and the European security order, at the core of which is every state’s right to choose its own security policy solutions. This is the right that Sweden exercised to choose NATO membership – independently and with broad popular and parliamentary support.

Russia wants to force a system into place where small and medium-sized states, such as Sweden, cannot choose their own path freely and democratically – a system where they are subjugated and brought to their knees. 

This is the essence of Russia’s demands for a new European security order: an order created by the power of the sword, resting on ‘might is right’.

As the issue of peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia is now on the agenda, the core of our position is thus clear: peace must not be negotiated above Ukraine’s head, and its main focus must be Ukraine’s – and Europe’s – security. 

Sweden continues to support Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts to achieve sustainable and fair peace based on international law and the UN Charter. Our economic, military and humanitarian support will also continue for as long as it takes. 

As both the Prime Minister and I have underscored on several occasions, support to Ukraine will be the foremost foreign policy task in the coming years. For Sweden, this is an existential question. Without a fair, rules-based world order, both our neighbourhood and the world as a whole become more insecure. 

This is also why we must stand up for international law worldwide. As a medium-sized country that is dependent on the rest of the world, we must show that we are principled and consistent. We must practice what we preach.

This is brought to the fore by the conflict in the Middle East, which stirs up strong emotions both in Sweden and internationally. 

Israel’s right to defend itself following the worst mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust, and so too the need for the country to now do more to protect the civilian population and increase the inflow of, and access to, humanitarian assistance. International law, including humanitarian law, must be respected. 

In the long term, a negotiated two-state solution based on international law is needed. Gaza's freedom from the rule of Hamas is a political prerequisite for this. This is the only sustainable solution in which Israelis and Palestinians can live side by side in peace, freedom and democracy.

Based on these premises, we do not need to evaluate or review individual decisions from international courts. However, we do need to protect international courts’ integrity and independence when so many other actors are not. 

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In this insecure geopolitical situation, authoritarian and illiberal forces are trying to advance their positions. 

This is reflected in the democratic backsliding that we’re seeing in many countries. 

It’s reflected in the undermining of the rule of law, which is also taking place here in the EU. 

It's reflected in the attacks against women’s, girls’ and LGBTIQ people’s full enjoyment of their human rights, which is happening in many parts of the world. 

In countries such as Afghanistan and Iran, authoritarian rule is based on comprehensive and systematic oppression of women. 

Sweden can never accept this. Sweden stands firm as these values are being challenged around the world. 

In my view, Sweden has a particular role to play when it comes to global defence of gender equality, which is a priority area for Sweden in the UN and our development assistance. 

Sweden supports the United Nations Population Fund, the UN’s primary agency for promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights. 

We also support UN Women, which delivers strong results in its coordinating role on gender equality within the UN system. 

In addition, Sweden will take on the role of Chair of UN Women’s Executive Board next year – an important year, as the global platform for gender equality, the Beijing Platform for Action, turns 30. 

Gender equality is a core value in Sweden’s foreign policy. It is always mainstreamed throughout our policy, but it will be highlighted in more ways next year. 

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While we safeguard our core values, we must take account of the changing balance of power and the fact that the geopolitical focal point has shifted eastwards.    

The Government is therefore focusing clearly on Asia, in both the new foreign trade strategy and security policy, where we have adopted an approach that pursues increased cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

China is the world’s second-largest economy and a leader in technology; at the same time, the country remains under authoritarian rule and has growing global ambitions. China’s conduct towards Taiwan is worrying, and threats of military violence are unacceptable. Sweden’s relations with China must be anchored in a European strategy and close transatlantic cooperation.

We welcome dialogue and cooperation with China where this is possible and in line with our interests and values, for aims such as promoting trade on equal terms and tackling climate change.

We expect China and the rest of the Indo-Pacific region to be a central focus of US and European foreign policy in the coming years, which we are also taking into account. 

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A clear-cut conclusion of this is that we in Europe need to take greater responsibility for our own defence and security. 

That takes me to Sweden’s next strategic interest: the security and stability of our neighbourhood, and us making the best possible use of our forms of cooperation with Allies and partners.  

The Statement of Foreign Policy proclaimed that the Government’s foreign policy rests on European, Nordic-Baltic and transatlantic foundations. 

Another way to express this is that our foreign policy belongs to three areas. 

We are a Baltic Sea country with particularly close historical and cultural ties to our closest cooperation partner, Finland, and strong cooperation with the Baltic countries. 

We are Europeans, with Germany as our closest trade partner and almost 30 years as a member of the EU.

And we are Western and transatlantic, which is now also manifested in our NATO membership. 

For far too long, Swedish foreign policy was characterised by an idea that we should be a moral superpower. 

This was an expression to convey a type of Swedish exceptionalism – a moral superpower whose morals consisted of not choosing sides. A moral superpower with a belief that we could shape the world not through action, but through political symbolism. 

This notion weakened Sweden’s influence and distanced us from the countries that have always stood closest to us geographically and in terms of values – in the Nordic region, Europe and the West. 

With this Government, we have consigned that notion to the history books. 

With NATO membership, we have finally come home. 

Having previously chosen to not take sides, we are now standing up for what is right. For peace, freedom and democracy – not just in words, but in actions.

We now have the opportunity to fully participate in the cooperation formats that are crucial to shaping our future. 

We finally have a united and strong Baltic Sea region, anchored in both NATO and the EU. This, if anything, is in Sweden’s foreign and security policy interest. 

This was clearly illustrated two weeks ago, when the Prime Minister hosted a Nordic-Baltic Summit at Harpsund in which Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also took part.

This was the culmination of Sweden’s high ambitions in its role as this year’s coordinator of the informal Nordic and Nordic-Baltic foreign and security policy cooperation formats, N5 and NB8. 

The fact that all democratic countries around the Baltic Sea are now Allies brings new opportunities. A key priority for us in the coordinating role has therefore been to strengthen regional security policy dialogue and cooperation, including with Poland and Germany.

Collectively, the Nordic and Nordic-Baltic countries are a power. Collectively, we constitute a G20 economy and together/collectively we are the second-largest donor of military support to Ukraine, after the United States. Per capita, we are the largest by far.

We are a political and economic force to be reckoned with. Our initiatives have a greater impact when we join forces, such as when the Nordic-Baltic foreign ministers travelled together to Moldova and Ukraine in October to support their paths towards EU accession and present support packages to both countries to enable better resistance to Russia’s information and energy warfare. 

In the current situation, the Nordic-Baltic countries play a unique role. We all share the same basic assessment: Russia will remain a serious threat to Europe’s security for the foreseeable future. This insight unites us and has strengthened our cooperation, making it closer now than ever before.  

The goal under Sweden's coordination of the N5 and NB8 has been to strengthen Nordic and Nordic-Baltic cooperation, including among non-political or bureaucratic actors. Political institutes and think tanks are important cooperation platforms, and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs’ recent hosting of a meeting with Nordic-Baltic sister organisations is significant in this context. 

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Nordic-Baltic cooperation will also grow ever stronger between our defence forces, particularly now that Sweden has joined NATO. As a NATO member, Sweden pursues a solidarity-based Alliance policy that aims to enhance security and stability in our neighbourhood and the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole.

The path to increased stability and security currently goes via strong deterrence. Our overriding interest as a NATO member is the credibility of Article 5. We must safeguard our security in relation to an aggressive Russia, and we must do so from a position of strength.

This requires both strong military capability and political cohesion. Sweden’s guiding principles as a NATO member are unity and solidarity. We are fully committed to covering our costs, managing our risks and shouldering our responsibilities. Safeguarding the Alliance’s cohesion means safeguarding its strength.  

With Sweden as a NATO member, the Alliance has expanded significantly, and the Arctic, North Atlantic and Baltic Sea regions have been woven together. Swedish territory is key to the Allies’ defence of Northern Europe. 

I therefore want to be crystal clear: Sweden fully embraces the opportunities that our geography provides us to also strengthen the collective defence of our neighbours. This is good for us, our neighbours and the whole of NATO. 

Sweden will also contribute valuable military capabilities to NATO, including advanced combat aircraft, a unique underwater capability and well-trained soldiers and officers. These capabilities are an important contribution to the Alliance’s deterrence.

The prerequisite for this, of course, is strong national defence. Next year, Sweden’s defence spending will reach 2.4 per cent of GDP. In 10 years, the defence appropriation will have tripled.     

This enables us to be a credible, reliable and committed Ally, and to shoulder the responsibilities that come with our geography. We are strengthening NATO’s capabilities and we are investing in the Alliance’s cohesion.

In addition to the 600 Swedish soldiers deployed to NATO’s Forward Land Forces in Latvia that I mentioned initially, we will also provide warships to NATO’s Standing Naval Forces, provide additional fighter aircraft to NATO’s Air Policing, and contribute to other peacetime operations and activities to maintain NATO’s overall deterrence. 

We will also meet our regional responsibilities as a framework nation in NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Finland, where NATO’s Forward Land Forces will be led by Swedish officers. 

Throughout this, a top priority for Sweden is to counteract Russia’s capability to do harm. 

It’s why we’re strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence in northern Europe. 

It’s why we’re building up our defence, while supporting Ukraine’s military capability.

It’s why we’re strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation and advocating for EU sanctions initiatives to undermine Russia’s resource base. 

And it’s why we’re safeguarding the transatlantic link and trying to engage countries outside our neighbourhood to defend a rules-based world order, based on the UN Charter.

While we point to the serious threat from Russia, we should remind ourselves that time is not on Russia’s side. 

The war economy into which Putin has shifted the country – and which increasingly resembles the Soviet command economy – is making Russia increasingly weak. Russia’s growing dependence on soldiers and military equipment from North Korea and weapons from Iran are signs of the weaknesses of its armed forces and defence industry. 

Our sanctions are yielding results, and we have every reason to tighten them further. An important example of this is the restrictions on Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’: oil tankers used to transport large volumes of crude oil and registered under other flags of convenience. 

In addition to posing serious risks to the Baltic Sea environment, this is also an important tool for Russia to fund its war economy. Here, Sweden is a driving force in the EU for stricter measures against vessels in the shadow fleet. 

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In a world of conflict, confrontation and competition, trade, research and innovation are also the subjects of power politics. 

As a country of industry, engineering and innovation, Sweden has particular interests here, which we must now assert in a different way than before. 

Trade with the rest of the world has built the prosperity that we Swedes enjoy. Trade has not made us vulnerable, but strong. 

As trade is now being portrayed as a problem, Sweden is therefore the clearest voice for free trade in the EU. 

This does not mean that we should scale back our ambitions in efforts to impose effective sanctions against Russia. It does not mean that we are naive in the face of risks that our openness can lead to.  

Sweden takes discussions on economic security very seriously. We recognise that areas such as artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, quantum technology and biotechnology entail particular risks for our security and the technology ending up in the wrong hands. 

As a knowledge nation, we have a lot to protect. According to the UN World Intellectual Property Organization, Sweden is the world’s second-most innovative country after Switzerland. We have a strong tradition of free research, businesses that put major resources into research and development, and public authorities that create the right conditions. 

We therefore see an increased need for international cooperation at the intersection of technology, innovation, trade and economic security. Cooperating in the EU and NATO is key to enable us to strengthen our economic security, and we also need to develop our bilateral cooperation with like-minded countries. Some examples are the EU’s European Economic Security Strategy, the EU’s guidelines for security in telecommunications and Sweden’s dialogue with the US on cyber and digital issues.

But at the same time, we must protect trade – both the rules that establish the frameworks for our trade and the free shipping lanes that enable trade between countries and between continents. 

Trade is a guarantor not only of our prosperity, but also our security. Time and time again, open trade routes have proved crucial for securing livelihoods, including in times of crisis and war. 

Once again, look no further than Ukraine, which has very impressively managed to keep its economy going and thus its defence capability as well.

The European Union is built on trade within the Single Market, but also with the rest of the world. Our common market and trade policy are, quite simply, what make the EU and its Member States of interest to the rest of the world. The Single Market is a geopolitical asset. 

It is an asset that we must harness in order to conclude more trade agreements with more partners. If we don’t, we will clear the field for other actors to gain influence in the world’s growth markets in Asia, Latin America and Africa. 

That’s why it’s excellent news that the European Commission and four Mercosur countries – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – finalised negotiations for an EU-Mercosur agreement after 25 years. 

While these negotiations were ongoing, the EU lost ground in the region. As Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade Benjamin Dousa recently highlighted, China’s exports of goods to Mercosur have increased by 56 per cent in the last 10 years, and its imports have increased by 111 per cent. During this same period, the EU’s exports to those countries have decreased by 7 per cent and imports have decreased by 1 per cent. 

This has been an economic and geopolitical mistake. The EU must show its external free trade friends that they need to prioritise us as partners. 

Our time of being able to delegate large and difficult foreign and security policy tasks to others is over.

We must now stand up for our interests and values together with our Allies and partners. 

To secure the north-eastern corner of Europe that is ours. 

To stop authoritarian forces that want to divide, rule and destabilise our and our Allies’ open societies. 

To keep trade and shipping lanes free in order to secure our supply. 

And ultimately, to safeguard our democracy, freedom, independence and freedom of action. 

In the current situation, Sweden will not be strong by standing alone or making concessions.

Sweden will not be strong through what we say, but through what we do together with others.

We will become strong by joining and building alliances. We will become strong by clearly stating our interests, and by working for them with our like-minded partners.

With our Nordic-Baltic neighbours, our European friends, our transatlantic Allies and our global partners. 

We live in troubled times.

It’s easy and at times tempting to make dramatic historical comparisons, but to paraphrase one of the Russian classics: all happy times are alike, while each unhappy time is unhappy in its own way. 

In any case, what is clear is that nothing is decided by fate. Individual actions, such as President Zelenskyy’s decision to remain in Kyiv rather than leave Ukraine during the initial days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, show that what we do matters, even in the darkest of times. 

With the right decisions and with determination, we can turn things in the right direction. All for the purpose of fulfilling the Government’s most important task: making Sweden freer and more secure.