Implications of Sweden’s NATO Membership for Russia and the Baltic Region

Sweden’s NATO accession will reshape the Baltic’s security environment. But how consequential will its membership be?

Sweden’s prime minister, Ulf Kristersson, hailed his country’s official entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), on 7 March 2024, as a “historic but natural step.” After over 200 years of military nonalignment, public opinion in Sweden overwhelmingly swung in favour of joining the alliance following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This decision is set to significantly reshape the security landscape of the Baltic region. 

Sweden as the Force Multiplier in Baltics 

Sweden brings a wealth of assets to NATO. As the fifth largest country in Europe, it can significantly strengthen the defence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the other three Baltic NATO states. Sweden’s geographical position allows for rapid maritime and air support, and significantly adds to troop numbers. From 2025 onward, Sweden plans to send an army battalion of 800 troops to Latvia.  

Sweden has the region’s third-largest navy, bolstering troop and material transportation across the critical waterway. It has deep experiences with submarines and sub-sea capabilities, increasingly crucial in a Baltic Sea that has suffered incidents such as the blowing up of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Sweden’s unique amphibious troops, adept at navigating the Baltic’s challenging coastlines, further enhance the operational efficiency of the alliance.  

The Swedish Air Force, the largest in the Nordic region, boasts advanced weaponry capable of deterring potential air and naval threats. This includes RBS15 anti-ship missiles, as well as Meteor and AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, providing significant support to NATO in potential Baltic confrontations. 

Prior to Sweden’s NATO accession, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania faced a logistical challenge. Reinforcements and supplies could only be delivered through the Suwałki Gap, a narrow and exposed 100 kilometre corridor separating them from Poland. This vulnerability is now mitigated by Sweden’s access to the Baltic Sea. The strategically located Gotland Island, less than 200 kilometres from the Latvian coast, offers an alternative route for military movement in times of crisis. In 2018, Sweden reintroduced a regiment on Gotland, which now includes about 370 soldiers. Linas Linkevičius, Lithuania’s former foreign minister and current ambassador to Stockholm, commented on this strategic shift, stating, “With the opening of the Baltic Sea as a NATO Sea, the Suwałki Gap becomes less vulnerable. Maybe the Russians should become more worried. Kaliningrad will not survive if they dare to challenge NATO.”  

Implications of Sweden’s accession on Russian interests 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed strong disapproval, stating, “All the long decades of good neighbourliness have gone to dust.” He said that Russia’s response would include “additional systems that will be appropriate to the threats that could appear on the territory of Finland and Sweden.” 

A major concern for Russia appears to be the encirclement of Kaliningrad, an exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Housing Russia’s Baltic Fleet and nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, Kaliningrad is a crucial strategic outpost. With Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the alliance now controls both sides of the Gulf of Finland, a vital waterway for Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg, and a key route for oil exports.  

However, Sweden’s role in NATO extends beyond immediate Baltic Sea concerns. Unlike frontline states bordering Russia, Sweden offers a robust logistical network. Its extensive railway infrastructure will be vital for rapid troop and equipment movement across the region in case of a conflict. Additionally, Gothenburg, Sweden’s largest port, is poised to become a major entry point for NATO forces and supplies. 

Sweden’s contribution extends even further. A renowned arms exporter, particularly to the United States, Sweden strengthens NATO’s military capabilities with advanced weaponry. This includes guided missiles, infantry weapons, anti-tank systems, and armoured vehicles. 

While the focus is currently on the Baltic Sea, analysts such as Dr Mary Glantz of the US Institute of Peace (USIP) suggest Russia might be more concerned about the long-term implications for the Arctic. This resource-rich and strategically significant region is increasingly attracting international attention. Though Sweden and Finland do not directly border the Arctic Ocean, their inclusion in NATO has the potential to substantially bolster the alliance’s military presence in this critical area. 

It is important to note that Sweden’s relationship with NATO is not entirely new. Sweden has been a partner country of NATO since the 1990s. It has previously participated in joint exercises and achieved interoperability with alliance forces. It even surpassed the alliance’s target of spending 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence. Additionally, a December 2023 agreement with the US allows for the presence of American troops and equipment on Swedish soil, excluding nuclear weapons and permanent bases. This pre-existing, close cooperation suggests Russia might have already factored in Sweden’s alignment with NATO. 

In sum, Sweden’s accession to NATO significantly alters the Baltic’s security landscape. It acts as a force multiplier, bolstering the defense of the three Baltic states, and enhances NATO’s overall military capabilities. While Russia perceives this development as a challenge, the true impact may be less dramatic than initially thought. Sweden’s military strength, at 38,000 troops, is relatively modest. Additionally, its reliance on smaller navy corvettes with limited air defense capabilities necessitates further investment in larger maritime assets. Sweden’s membership primarily formalises existing cooperation, with the potential for greater consequences lying in the Arctic region. The coming years will reveal how Sweden’s integration into NATO unfolds, and how Russia reacts to the transformed Baltic security environment. 

Rupal Mishra is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India. 

This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.